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Murphy: Objections to Western Conceptions of Human Rights

OBJECTIONS TO WESTERN CONCEPTIONS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr.*

Projects for the realization of human rights on a global scale
suffer from the lack of adequate instruments of enforcement. This
deficiency, as Professor Watson observes,' can be traced to the absence of political institutions whose authority transcends that of the
nation state. Nor is there a common preexisting social inheritance which can serve as a foundation for the substantive human
rights norms which a supranational legal system would implement.
This further deficiency reveals the absence of an authentic universal society. It also suggests deeper reasons why efforts to establish
a worldwide system of human rights through the United Nations
have met with limited success. Disagreement over the content of
humanistic principles constitutes a deficiency of even greater magnitude than the absence of effective procedures. Professor Watson
notes that legal systems do not precede the formation of political
order.2 But political stability itself depends upon an antecedent social consensus. The legal evolves from the political; the political is
sustained by a general loyalty to fundamental principles which the
polis embodies.
In this Article I endeavor to identify some of the major reasons
for the lack of a general agreement over the content of universal
human rights. Following these preliminary observations, I identify
some of the ideological factors which impede the development of a
concordance. Fundamental cultural and philosophical presuppositions which condition understanding of human rights are then addressed. Finally, I suggest changes in the academic treatment of
the subject which may help to overcome some of the obstacles to a
general agreement upon principles.

* Professor of Law, Duquesne University. J.D., 1957, Boston College; LL.M.,

1962, University of Virginia; Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law School, 1973-1974.
1. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human
Rights Norms in InternationalLaw, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS Norws L. F. 609 (1979).
2. Id. at 620-21.
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DIVERGENCE IN INTERPRETATION

Practical achievements in the field of human rights are, at certain levels, impressive. 3 But profound gaps remain between assertion and reality. A verbal consensus-whether in a declaration,
resolution, or covenant-does not determine practice. The discontinuities are not only the result of ineffective enforcement.
They also exist because the verbal formulations are susceptible of
great variations in interpretation.
Where textual language is imprecise, the meanings attributed
to the written words will not be uniform. This is generally understood with respect to domestic law. The great differences of meaning which the Justices of the Supreme Court can legitimately attribute to the Bill of Rights are illustrative. 4 Comparable difficulties
inherent in the articulation of universal human rights are not sufficiently appreciated, particularly by those international scholars
whose commitment.is inspired by the American constitutional experience.
On the global level divergence in interpretation may arise for
readily identifiable reasons. For example, South Africa's defiance
of numerous resolutions by the General Assembly, 5 Security Counel, 6 and other authoritative fora 7 flows from the apartheid policies
of the ruling minority which refuses to accept a wide understanding of human equality. The beliefs concerning racial differences between human beings shared by those holding political power in
South Africa are, from a universal perspective, morally repellent.
But when we move beyond cases of unjustified resistance
the problem of intrepretative variation becomes much more complicated.
Consider, for example, the great division between the industrial nations and the developing world over the meaning of the individual right to own property;8 or the differences between the
3.

See generally A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (1972); Sohn,

The Human Rights Law of the Charter,12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 129 (1977).
4. See, e.g., Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1975); Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN. L. Rv. 703 (1975).
5. E.g., G.A. Res. 2396, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 19-21, U.N. Doe. A17218
(1968).
6. E.g., S.C. Res. 182, 18 U.N. SCOR 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/5471 (1963).
7. E.g., E.S.C. Res. 1235, 42 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 17-18, U.N. Doc.

E/4393 (1967).
8.

For the reservations entered by the United States to the Declaration on the
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Third World and Liberal Democracies over the meaning of freedom of expression;9 or the difficulties surrounding the interpretation of self-determination.' 0 In these cases, the different senses attributed to ambiguous language cannot be traced to opposing moral
positions, one of whose illegitimacy is readily apparent. Here, general ideas about the nature of social life, the purposes of political
authority, and the destiny of nations, as well as of individuals, are
influential. "1
One of the unfortunate features of contemporary human rights
scholarship is its tendency to pass over these interpretative difficulties. They may be ignored; or, if they are tacitly acknowledged, an
effort is made to minimize their importance.' 2 Theory and reality
grow further apart as academics work zealously for the implementation of human rights as they understand them. Such a predisposition leads to the naive belief that human rights can be realized by
the simple expedient of more effective procedures. It not only ignores political factors; it also obscures the fact that a general allegiance to fundamental values is indispensable to the progressive realization of human rights throughout the world.
The Influence of Liberalism

One of the charges made by Professor Watson is that academics working in the field of human rights tend to reify their own
conceptions. 1 3 Investing the necessary authority with a spurious reality, they ignore the facts of political power which are the real obstacles to reform. Watson's analysis can be pursued. For example,
are the principles which these academics espouse concerning the
dignity of the person and the individual's entitlements against the
Establishment of a New Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 6 (special) U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doe. A19559 (1974), see U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2229 (1974), at 41-50,
reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 744 (1974).

9. Maheu, The Right to Information and the Right to the Expression of Opinion, in HUMAN RIGHTS (UNESCO 1949).
10. For the divergent interpretations in the third committee discussions, see 6
U.N. GAOR, Third Committee (397th mtg.) 300, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/SR.397 (1952). See
also Emerson, Self Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971); Rosenstock, The
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A
Survey, 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 713, 730-33 (1971).
11. See generally M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? (1973); M.
GINSBERG, ON JUSTICE IN SOCIETY (1965); POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF

MAN (D. Raphael ed. 1967).
12. See Watson, supra note 1, at 625.
13. Id. at 638-39.
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State equally illusory? Are these principles merely personal preferences or the reflection of values identified with a particular cultural
or historical experience? If so, how can they qualify as universal
human rights?
These deeper questions are raised by the absence of a general
consensus concerning the individual civil and political rights of
which American academics are the primary advocates. 14 One way
to address such questions is to consider the interpretations of such
rights not only as expressions of the personal convictions of those
promoting them, but also as reflections of general ideas concerning
the individual person and his or her relationship to society.
Liberalism is the leading ideological influence in Western
thought. Liberalism has general features which affect the objective
validity of particular interpretations of human rights. It places the
individual and his or her interests at the center of social, political,
and legal theory. 15 Liberalism also implies certain ideas concerning the origins of social life. In the literature these ideas are contractarian. Each person is sovereign in a state of nature. All agree,
in advance, to the terms of a social compact. Upon the formation
of political society, natural rights to freedom, life, and property are
exchanged for civil rights. The purpose of government is to secure
and advance these civil rights.16
Since the eighteenth century, Liberalism has had a beneficial
influence upon the evolution of rights and public policy in the
Western democracies. Curbing abuses of governmental power,
Liberalism has also encouraged the release of positive personal energies in all aspects of social, economic, and political life.' 7 As lib14. See Sidorsky, Contemporary Reinterpretations of the Concept of Human
Rights, in ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 88 (D. Sidorsky ed. 1979). I am grateful to my
colleague Kenneth Hirsch for referring me to these essays.
15. Two works by Professor Roberto Unger provide a general summary and critique of the principles of Liberalism. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS

(1975); R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976). Although they take divergent
positions on fundamental issues, the works of John Bawls and Robert Nozick are in
the liberal, individualistic tradition. See R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
(1974); J. BAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). For an evaluation of both works, see

C. MURPHY, MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY ch. 4 (1978).
16. The textual summary reflects the principles of Locke's political philosophy
in J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1956). There is a collection of the
social contract theories of Locke, Hume, and Rousseau in E. BARKER, SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU (1975). For an attempt to restate

Locke's theory in modem terms, see R. NOZICK, supra note 15.
17.

See WESTERN LIBERALISM (E. Bramsted & K. Melhuish ed. 1978); C.

FRANKEL, THE CASE FOR MODERN MAN (1956); cf. Katz, Post-Emancipation De-
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eral values become transnational in scope, Western academics, especially American, are puzzled by resistance to their adoption as
entitlements of all peoples. There are undoubtedly instances where
the refusal to recognize such values as human rights is perverse
-they constitute a threat to those wishing to exercise arbitrary
power. But nonrecognition, or qualified acceptance of liberal values
through restrictive interpretation of human rights documents, can
reflect more complex motivations.
Resistance can be observed within societies with venerable,
hierarchical structures, especially where changing political conditions have given ancient institutions a renewed vitality. In large
sections of the Islamic world, for example, the association of liberal
humanism with a secular view of life makes Western enthusiasm
for personal liberty unacceptable. Additionally, the primacy afforded
to the individual is often seen as incompatible with the preservation of social values.' 8
A human rights vision nurtured by liberal individualism has
also been found wanting by those closer to home. Consider, for example, the appraisal of a Canadian philosopher:
North-American liberalism expresses the belief in open
ended progress ....
As liberals become more and more aware
of the implications of their own doctrine, they recognize that no
appeal to human good, now or in the future, must be allowed to
limit their freedom to make the world as they choose. Social order is a man-made convenience, and its only purpose is to increase freedom . . . . The logic of this liberalism makes [value
judgments subjective. Man] in his freedom creates the valuable.
The human good is what we choose for our good.' 9
Legal scholars who advocate liberal values as universal rights are
often unaware of the adverse consequences of unbridled individualism. There are many reasons for this failure of comprehension, but
one is of paramount importance: These advocates fail to grasp the
connections between the realm of ideas and the practical realization of values. When we consider rival philosophical and political
systems, the interaction between thought and action is more
systematically developed.
velopment of Rights: Liberalism and Universalism, in ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 14, at 282.
18. See, e.g., Mayer, Libyan Legislation in Defense of Arabo-Islamic Sexual
Mores, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 287 (1980).
19. G. GRANT, LAMENT FOR A NATION 56-57 (1965).
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The Marxist Critique
The strongest criticism of liberal individualism has come from
those who write in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. A refusal to take
these criticisms seriously has contributed to our incapacity to appreciate fully the objections raised against Western conceptions of
human rights. Socialist opposition is anchored in its belief that civil
liberty as advanced by Liberalism is incompatible with deeper human needs and social development. This conviction is manifest in
the writings of Karl Marx. Referring to the American Constitution
and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, he argues:
[Tihe so-called rights of man as distinct from the rights of the
citizen are simply the rights of a member of civil society, that is,
of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the
community.
What constitutes liberty?
Liberty is . . . the right to do everything which does not
harm others. The limits within which each individual can act
without harming others are determined by Law, just as the
boundary between two fields is marked by a stake. It is the question of the liberty of man regarded as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself. [L]iberty as a right of man is not founded
upon the relations between man and man, but rather upon the
20
separation of man from man.
Marx then moves to an evaluation of specific rights. Significantly, he sees the right of private property as the primary expression of the general principle of liberty:
The practical application of the right of liberty is the right
of private property. What constitutes the right of private property?
[It is] the right to enjoy one's fortune and to dispose of it as
one will; without regard for other men and independently of society. It is the right of self-interest. This individual liberty, and
its application, form the basis of civil society. It leads every man
to see in other men, not the realization, but rather the limita21
tion of his own liberty.
20. Marx, On the Jewish Question, in
Tucker ed. 1978).
21. Id. (emphasis in original).

THE MAnX-ENGELS READER
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This critique of liberal individualism forms one of the principal
themes of the ideological struggle between the Socialist States and
the Western Democracies. Their political competition has been reflected in the human rights field, especially within the United Nations system. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides that "Everyone has the right to own property alone as
well as in association with others,"2 2 this entitlement is not reflected in the international covenants designed to implement the
Declaration.2 3 Resistance to the Western conception of private
property has also been of major importance in the conflict over the
nationalization policies of developing countries. In human rights
terms, Western claims of private ownership and demands for full
compensation in case of a taking are met by a Third World preference for a collective right of peoples to self-determination and per24
manent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources.
Socialist theory views claims of private property as the
benchmark of Western Liberalism. In the development of international law and policy during the past twenty years, general ideas
concerning the adverse consequences of private ownership, inspired by Socialist theory, have supported the rising expectations
of the developing world. During this period, American foreign policy was strongly oriented toward the protection of foreign investment. 25 Attempts to universalize American conceptions of property
values probably impeded our broader efforts to advance human

22. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A1810, at 71 (1948), reprinted in M. CRANSTON,
supra note 11, at 90.
23. See M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? ch. 4 (1964).
24. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 6 (special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9556
(1974). The collective rights also appear in the first article of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) and the International Covenant on Civ-

il and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966). For the aspirations behind these value assertions, see Fatouros,
InternationalLaw and the Third World, 50 VA. L. REv. 783 (1964).
25. See the Hickenlooper Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
22 U.S.C. § 2370(E) (1976), voiding Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 188 (1962) (full value as just compensation). For an analysis of
these developments, see Murphy, State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (1966).
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rights2 6 and obscured our deep commitments to personal freedom

and human dignity. In light of this recent history, academics
should be more sensitive to the belief of many that the transformation of Western values into universal human rights signifies the primacy of private interests and a denial of an interest in the promotion of general economic welfare.
The task of separating noneconomic personal rights from those
associated with private property may first appear to be relatively
simple. Prohibitions against slavery and arbitrary arrest, the right
not to be subject to torture,2 7 equality under the law: these, and
related principles, are widely accepted. They are obviously not derived from libertarian values related to private property. But beyond such fundamental distinctions there are complexities which
Western human rights advocates often do not take into account.
Consider, for example, the question of freedom of expression.
Western nations have made efforts to achieve an expansive understanding of this preferred freedom as a universal human right. In
international contexts these efforts have encountered difficulties.
Some are related to an aversion to human liberty; others are
grounded in commitments to other values that are also deserving
of respect.
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the General Assembly in December 1965,28 provides that states who are parties,
with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . [slhall declare an offence punish-

able by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority
or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts

of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group
of persons or another colour or ethnic origin .... 29

The United States voted for the convention as a whole, finding itself in agreement with its general objectives. Explaining this country's vote, Ambassador Goldberg stated that the quoted language

26.

See sources cited note 25 supra.

27. See the memorandum submitted by the United States in Filartiga v. PenaIrala, No. 79-6090 (2d Cir. 1980), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 585
(1980). But see Hazelton, Respectable Terrorism, HARPER'S, Oct. 1980, at 28, 31.
28. G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N. Doe. A/6014
(1965).
29. Id. at 48.
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could not be interpreted, under the law of the United States, as
preventing citizens from "expressing their views on any subject no
matter how obnoxious they may be or whether they are in accord
with government policy or not." 30 Whether or not the Ambassador's views accurately reflect American constitutional law, 31 they
illustrate that where an entitlement such as free expression is being
globally expanded, genuine disagreements will exist as to its appropriate range.
American scholars might profitably consider whether absolutist
interpretations of civil and political rights can be reconciled with
the need to build a general consensus concerning the nature and
scope of fundamental liberties. Initially, they might analyze the relationship between liberal political theory and various interpretations of freedom of expression. They should also examine how concentrations of political and economic power qualify the exercise of
free expression in the field of global communication.
In 1978, in deliberations before the International Commission
for the Study of Communication Problems, the Honorable M.
Mustapha Masmoudi, Tunisian Secretary of State for Information,
presented a document entitled The New World Information Order.32 The document attacked the monopoly position of the largest
transnational news agencies. It contended that their control over
the flow of information between the developed and developing nations was a remnant of the colonial period, that it distorted realities, and that it disregarded the cultural, moral, and political values
of the weaker states. 33 Accompanying these allegations were demands for restrictions upon the capacity of the dominant agencies
to penetrate developing societies freely and for greater access by
the Third World to the channels of communication. 34 These claims
are, of course, highly controversial. To draw attention to their existence within the global human rights dialogue is worthwhile,
30. 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 214 (1966). The United States has signed, but not
ratified, the Convention. Recent cases point up the importance of the question of
government interference with expression. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
31. Compare Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting denial of certiorari, joined by White, J.) with Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1950).
32. M. Mustapha Masmoudi, The New World Information Order (July 10-12,
1978). The author obtained this document through the facilities of Freedom House
in New York.
33. Id. at 5-7.
34. Id. at 16-21.
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however, if only to illustrate how the Western understanding of
human rights, with its individualistic ethos, is not prepared to deal
adequately with them.
TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE AND PURPOSE
OF HUMAN RIGHTS

International attacks upon Western values rely considerably
upon the language of domination, exploitation, and alienation,3 5 reflecting the influence which Socialist thought has had upon the formulation of human values in the developing nations. But Western
principles of freedom have also been influential. They have
penetrated the boundaries of Socialist States as well as those of the
Third World. The remarkable commitment of the physicist Andrei
Sakharov to intellectual freedom, 36 the witness of Alexander
Solzhenitsyn against Stalinist tyranny, 37 and the recent successful
strike by Polish workers38 all point to the pervasive, positive influence of libertarian principles and attest to their transcultural value
as human rights. These experiences demonstrate that our convictions are not completely conditioned by our own cultural and historical experience.
Yet, there are nuances which impartial inquiry cannot avoid.
One of the disturbing features of Solzhenitsyn's achievements is its
qualified enthusiasm for Western values. His dislike of the media is
notorious. He has also laid bare some of the philosophical presuppositions of Liberalism: Its desire for absolute personal autonomy;
its subjective conception of happiness; and its refusal to accept any
35.

See, e.g., id. The fifteenth session of the General Assembly adopted a Dec-

laration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). Paragraph 1
provides: "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploita-

tion constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of
the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-

operation." Id. at 67. See also Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202, 6 (special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1)

5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
36. See A. SAKHAROV, PROGRESS, COEXISTENCE AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM (1968). See also Solzhenitsyn, As Breathing and Consciousness Return, in
FROM UNDER THE RUBBLE 3 (A. Solzhenitsyn ed. 1975).
37. See, e.g., A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO (1974). See also

Litvinov, The Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union, in ESSAYS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 113.

38.

See Darnton, 60 Days that Shook Poland, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, § 6

(Magazine), at 39.
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order of objective values superior to the individual will. Liberalism's contempt of the spiritual and its refusal to recognize distinctions between good and evil impoverishes the Western ideal of humanism. When the boundaries of freedom are determined
exclusively by reference to legal criteria, the total regime invites
the selfish use of liberty.
Solzhenitsyn concludes that he would not propose the Western model for adoption in his native land. Nor would he recommend Socialism as an alternative. Many of the same principles of
autonomous, materialistic humanism which debase Western culture
permeate Socialist ideals. 40 Whatever its limitations, his critique
makes an important point that bears upon the future development
of universal human rights.
The Western Democracies and Socialist States are, respectively, advocates of the two principal expressions of human rights
in international law: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4 ' and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. 42 Each covenant promotes a specific vision of
human values as a universal and comprehensive ideal; 43 yet each
fails as a complete explanation of human destiny. The values
embodied in each covenant provide a valid, partial insight into a
whole system of human rights. 4 Together, these documents offer a
39. Address by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, A World Split Apart (June 8, 1978)
(Harvard University Commencement), reprinted in 44 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY

678, (1978).
40. Id. But see Shafarevich, Socialism in Our Past and Future, in FROM UNDER
THE RUBBLE, supra note 36, at 26.

41. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doe. A16316 (1966).
42. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
43. This point is more fully developed in Murphy, Ideological Interpretations
of Human Rights, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 286 (1971). From the beginning of the human
rights movement within the United Nations, connections were perceived between
civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights. The relation between the two sets of fundamental values is examined in McKeon, The Philosophic
Bases and Material Circumstances of the Rights of Man, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 9, at 32. The conflict between the two is the theme of the International Political
Science Association Symposium on Human Rights. POLITICAL THEORY AND THE
RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 11. See also J. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 103-07

(1951). Maritain emphasizes that the recognition of the right of man as a working
person, entitled to share in the material, social, and cultural aspects of civilized life,
is not the exclusive realm of Marxism or any other ideology.
44. In the preparation of the International Covenants, the official position of
the Socialist states was that civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights
should be the subject of a single covenant. See Przetacznik, The Socialist Concept of
Protection of Human Rights, 38 Soc. RESEARCH 337, 349 (1971). Before that position

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 433

comprehensive view of fundamental values which, in turn, reflect
that general consensus indispensable to the establishment of political institutions with effective enforcement power.
The intellectual task is to attain a deeper understanding of the
nature and purpose of human rights. As a beginning, it may be
suggested that academics move back from postures of zealous advocacy 4 5 and engage in a more reflective enterprise. Greater concen-

tration upon the philosophical premises of Western values can help
to clarify the content and limits of the civil and political liberties
which constitute the Western contribution to an emerging universal society. And increased attention should be given to the vision
of human entitlements held by those who, directly or indirectly,
are influenced by Marxist Socialism.
The effort to arrive at universal human rights standards should
be transferred from the domain of political argument to intellectual
dialogue, and the issues separating the two ideologies reduced to
essentials. To take a basic example: What is the true relation between liberty and property? Are private initiative and the accumulation of wealth egoistic, as Marxists claim, or are they socially, as
well as personally, beneficial?46 Further, why should the fate of the
human person be a matter of international concern? Leaving questions of effective human rights protection aside, can we articulate
the moral foundations of such supreme consideration? Marxist ideology has no integral concept of the human person. 47 But does the
West have anything more than a passionate attachment to individualism? Or, as Solzhenitsyn charges, has the severance of modern
Western thought from a domain of higher values left it incapable of
maintaining an intellectual or moral defense of personal freedom?
Without answers to such questions, Western scholars cannot repudiate the Marxist view that man liberates himself by becoming absorbed in community.
is dismissed as a political posture, it should be remembered that the United States
and United Kingdom opposed the inclusion of economic, social, and cultural rights
in the covenant which was to implement the Universal Declaration of 1948. See

Alston, The United Nations' Specialized Agencies and Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 83 (1979).
45. For a general discussion on the inordinate demands of moral passions in

modem times, see Polanyi, Beyond Nihilism, in KNOWING AND BEING ch. 1 (M. Grene
ed. 1969).
46. Compare M. GINSBERG, supra note 11, at 94-117 with R. TAWNEY, THE AcQUISITIVE SOCIETY (1920).
47. See J. MARITAIN, MORAL PHILOSPHY 234-40 (1964).
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In orthodox Marxism, the problem of individualism is resolved
by the historical dialectic. When society was divided into rival
classes and capitalists were dominant, contradictions existed between the individual and the state. Where Communism triumphs,
the problem is resolved because the government is the collective
individual. 48 One has only to reflect upon recent events in
Indochina to grasp the human suffering which can be caused by
such an abstraction. But what powers of mind do we possess to refute Marxist theories?
If the personal freedoms associated with Western culture are
to be extended globally, the relationships between value preferences and general theory must be taken more seriously. Human
rights are not self-explanatory. Nor do they evolve from the moral
imperatives of individual consciences. 49 Behind all claims of right
lie antecedent beliefs about the nature of the human person and
the structure of society. Unless scholars critically examine these
presuppositions,, it is impossible to oppose the gradual elimination
of individuality which is the challenge of Marxism.
The competition between Western Liberalism and Marxist Socialism 50 raises ultimate questions concerning political authority.
Both International Covenants provide that "[a]ll peoples have the
right of self-determination," 51 but the quoted language is not supported by a common understanding of its terms. It is subject to
collectivist interpretation, especially by groups seeking to justify
their political status in the name of a Hegelian or Marxist ideal. On
the other hand, Liberalism traces all authority back to individual
consent. This provides it with a powerful weapon for resisting arbi48. See generally Tchechko, The Conceptionof the Rights of Man in the U.S.S.R.
Based on Official Documents, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 158.

49. Professor Dworkin's Hard Cases thesis, Dworkin, supra note 4, is a recent
example of such an approach in the realm of judicial decisionmaking. This propensity of modem thought is traced in C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE
PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 72-75 (1963). Perelman documents the general transition from

transcendent religious norms to the imperative of practical reason as the measure of
right and justice.
50. To simplify analysis I have used these generic labels. The actual political
divergences within the two general categories are recognized in Murphy, supra note
43, at 288.
51. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 53, U.N. Doe. A16316 (1966); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
16) 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966). Both covenants provide: "All peoples have the right
of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development"
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trary power. And Liberalism's emphasis upon personal entitlements accentuates the right of each individual to participate in the
political life of his or her country. 52 But is such an individual right
meant to imply nothing more than the assertion of self-interest
-- of "man separated from other men," 53 entitled to pursue political
power simply to achieve personal ends?
For Liberalism, political activity is a temporary necessity. It is
undertaken to assure the order which makes possible the individual
pursuit of happiness in the private realm. This attitude makes
"'public life entirely secondary and instrumental of private life." 5 4
As the separate person stands in a negative relation to public authority, it is assumed that men will not find fulfillment in public affairs.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that the
will of the people shall be the basis of government. 5 5 At the level
of philosophical reflection it is difficult for Liberalism to provide a
cogent defense of this principle. Its espousal of an atomistic conception of social life is an impediment. If each person is sovereign,
and society is an aggregate of individual wills, how does one realize
that the people, as a body politic, possess ultimate sovereign
authority? Without some articulation of the foundations of government it is impossible to effectively challenge the distortions of
self-determination which are the currency of Marxist-inspired interpretations of the International Covenants.
In the Anglo-American experience, the whole populace, and
not a class or party, is understood to be the supreme source of all
legitimate power. In political dialogue with Marxists, defenders of
Western democracy have understood how deeply this tradition separates the two ideologies. Speaking of the prospects for coexistence,
George Kennan once remarked that the Communist system was essentially unacceptable because
it does not fully recognize the organized expression of the
popular will. There would be no one quicker than I to admit
that all parliamentary systems, all systems of elections, are im-

52. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 55, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
53. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
54. Schaar ... And the Pursuit of Happiness, 46 VA. Q. REv. 1 (1970); cf. J.
HABE.MAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE (1973) (critique of Liberalism).

55. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, art.
21(3).
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perfect ....
But it is this which lies at the heart of our disagreement with you. We feel that until there exists on the Communist side a disposition to accept expressions of the popular will,
however imperfect, as the ultimate basis of political action and as
the determination of political authority, there will remain a contradiction between the concept of ideological competition . . .
56
and the concept of coexistence.
With its fear of the tyranny of majorities Liberalism has not
given the expression of popular will a primary role in its political
theory. 57 If that approach is modified the Western democracies will
then be able to offer to the world a complete, coherent vision of
human rights.
56. Kennan, On Coexistence 26 (Occasional Paper, Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions 1965).
57. Compare J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) with R. DwoUCN, TAIaNG RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977). But see Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L.

REv. 405 (1979):
Originally-in some hypothetical conceptual state of nature-the individual
is autonomous, his or her own master. In society, the autonomy of each individual is combined with that of other individuals, and transformed into sovereignty of the people. Sovereignty of the people implies self-government
by the people, directly or through chosen representatives. But every individual retains some of his or her original autonomy as "rights" which are protected even against the people and their representatives.
Id. at 408. For a discussion of the notion of general authority of the people, see
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTrUION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 326-339 (1970).
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